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Metaphysical Considerations of Time
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Winchester College and
The University of Oxford
In this exploration of the nature oftime, the author shows that more than a superficial
belief in a creator God invites the person offaith to engage with some of the unsettling
questions presented by modern physics and cosmology. He considers how human beings
study and measure time, and he also treats how we experience time as creatures "caught" in
its passage, and the emotions evoked by that experience. The various possible paths of the
future of the universe are provocative subjects for theological treatment.
Introduction
Time was invented to stop everything
from happening at once. Indeed, if it were
not for the experienced properties of time,
this talk would simultaneously begin and
end, and we could all go home. Now there's
a mercy! But time is—whatever it is—and
the lecture must begin and end, an experi-
ence of duration, mingled with hope.
This presentation grew out of drawing
graphs and thinking about Caroline, Princess
of Wales. The graph part was completely
straightforward, simply a matter of staring at
something utterly commonplace in the life of
scientists. On graphs, time is always the in-
dependent variable, and the horizontal axis is
conventionally labelled as the time axis. I was
staring at a graph of space versus time and
thinking about the point of intersection of the
x and y axes, a point called the origin, when
the phrase, "God is here; Christ is now," came
to mind, and this lecture began to take shape.
As for Caroline, Princess of Wales in
the early years of the eighteenth century, her
tenuous connection with this lecture arises
because I recalled reading that she had re-
ceived a letter from Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz, co-inventor of the calculus. In his
letter, Leibniz complained about the decline
of natural religion in England: he blamed
Newton for this. Caroline, who was intel-
lectually equipped to take a lively interest
in such matters, passed Leibniz's letter on
to the Reverend Samuel Clarke, who de-
fended Newton; and thus began the famous
Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, which in-
cluded an illuminating debate about time in
classical physics—and provided the other
starting point for this lecture.
The theological and metaphysical
framework of the lecture is that of Chris-
tianity. Christianity, with its claims to be an
historical religion, has always taken time se-
riously, that is, it has concerned itself with
events in time and measured the life of this
world from an unique event.
The life and death of Jesus of Nazareth
happened during the prefecture of Pontius
Pilate. Salvation Histoiy is measured against
time. Thus, at its heart, a religion that came
to say ofGod that God is Christlike and that
/'// God is no un-Christlikeness at all poses
for itself the problem posed of the relation-
ship between God. time, and eternity. In
his fine study, The Future, philosophy tutor
at Merton College, Oxford, J. R. Lucas as-
serts that "reality is through and through tem-
poral. Equally, God is temporal, though not
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merely that." ' And if we question this,
Lucas reminds us that in Christianity, God
is personal. And ifGod is personal, then tem-
poral, and if temporal then in some sense in
time, not outside it.
Time is not a thing that God might or
might not create, but a category, a neces-
sary concomitant of the existence of a
personal being, though not of a mathe-
matical entity. This is not to say that time
is an independent category, existing
outside of God. It exists because of God:
not merely because of some act of will on
His part, but because of His nature: if the
ultimate reality is personal, then it
follows that time must exist. God did not
make time, but time stems from God. 2
With respect to time, is it possible ac-
tually to know whether one is dealing with
factual certainties (to know, that is, in the
With respect to time, is it possible
actually to know whether one is deal-
ing with factual certainties (to know,
that is, in the traditional philosophical
sense ofa justified true belief) or utter
ing a "merely subjective" statement
about one fs psychological condition?
traditional philosophical sense of a justi-
fied true belief) or uttering a "merely sub-
jective" statement about one's psychologi-
cal condition? St. Augustine of Hippo
wrote, "Time is a dimension of the soul,
not of the outer world." 3 In a comple-
mentary view, Hermann Weyl asserted,
The objective world simply is; it does
not happen. Only to the gaze of my
consciousness, crawling upward along
the life line (world line) of my body,
does a section of this world come to life
as a fleeting image in space which
continuously changes in time. 4
Whether the sources of our ideas about time
lie in the phenomenal world or are artifacts
of consciousness, there are interesting in-
sights about the atemporalities of the uncon-
scious mind that might affect our notions of
eternity.
God, too, is held traditionally to be in-
comprehensible: the concept encoded by the
term God is elusive and our images are in-
adequate or possibly quite misleading. Can
one know that any predicates apply un-
equivocally to God—not least, slippery
predicates such as eternal! Tillich thought
one ought to be at least very wary here. Fools
rush in. ..or, perhaps, we should stop now.
We were encouraged by Augustine to speak
something about God rather than nothing.
After the lecture, you might think nothing
would have been preferable.
Measuring time and the shape of time
Like Judaism, and unlike
many animistic religions,
Christianity held, and holds, a
linear rather than a cyclic
model of history. History, the
theater of the operations of
God among human societies,
is going somewhere. Time has
direction.
And it can be argued that
monastic Christianity, with its
desire to sanctify all the hours
of the day through the regular
progression of the offices of
the Church (lauds, matins and so on), pro-
vided the impetus for the more accurate
measurement of time by means other than
the irregular patterns of nature, of the rising
and setting of the sun, for instance, or the
annual return of the seasons—in other words,
by astronomy. The local solar clock doesn't
operate in nice, neat, whole numbers: the
Earth Year in the year 2000 will be 365 days,
5 hours, 48 minutes, and 45 seconds long.
But we mustn't count on that lasting. On
average, the sidereal year (time taken for the
earth to orbit the sun or rotate around a com-
mon centre of gravity with the sun) becomes
less by half a second per century. Since
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1 972, thank goodness, Atomic Time replaced
wobbly Earth Time (in units of the regular
oscillations of cesium atoms,
290,091,200,500,000,000 of them make up
a year).
Our calendars are cyclic: February re-
curs annually, Friday occurs weekly. The
years change in a linear way. A.d. occurs
after b.c.—or c.e. occurs after b.c.e. I have
heard it argued that time is a Christian mat-
ter, and in the year 2000 (or possibly 2001 ),
Christians will celebrate the bimillennium
of Christ's birth, and that proves that time a
Christian matter.
Against this, one could point out that
the names of the months and days in the West
are pretty thoroughly pagan: Augustus, Thor,
Julius, Freya, the day of the Moon and the
Sun. All these are more frequently on our
commemorating lips that a.d. or c.e.
Chronos time and kairos time
Greek has two words for time, chronos
and kairos. Chronos time is measured time:
it has duration, can be cut up into measur-
able increments down to nanoseconds and
beyond, and is, in this sense, decoupled from
astronomy.
Apart from astronomical reference, how
cultures traditionally measure chronos time
is very variable. For instance, in villages in
rural India, before the arrival of digital
watches, the shortest time interval that could
be meaningfully discussed was the time
taken to boil rice, about thirteen minutes.
In the West, chronos time came to be
measured by reference to increasingly so-
phisticated technological means, external to
the person. Candle clocks, water clocks,
mechanical clocks (some of great beauty
such as the mediaeval clock in Wells Ca-
thedral in England)—all such devices di-
vided time into units not derived from ob-
servable astronomical events. The search
for more and more precise ways to mea-
sure time is a central feature of the history
of science and technology. Some here may
have read Dava Sobel's book, Longitude,
that most interesting account of the devel-
opment of accurate navigation, made pos-
sible by improved chronometry. New Age
writers critical of the rise of Western sci-
ence have argued that the obsession with
more and more accurate chronometry has
had an unfortunate effect of distancing the
human chronometrer from the processes of
the natural world.
Kairos time is different: kairos is sig-
nificant time, meaningful time. Years are
not experienced as sequences of equal inter-
vals of measured time. Rather, we celebrate
Easter and Christmas, birthdays and anni-
versaries, beginnings and ends of academic
terms, all very non-homogeneous in experi-
ence. When a child is at play or a student is
waiting for an exam, or when a person is in
love or waiting to go into combat, time is
not chronos: it is kairos. The catholic
Church year is mapped by chronos but ex-
perienced as kairos. Lent, for instance, lasts
forty days (and forty nights), and is, there-
fore, chronos. But it is also a penitential
season, when we are to "smite the hosts of
mydion" by holy fasting, abstinence, and
inspissated gloom. So, we apply somber
purple liturgical vestments to priest and al-
tar, to remind us of the kairos, the experien-
tial aspect of the season.
The problem for theologians
Our understanding of time has changed
from the commonsensical, pre-scientific
view to the Newtonian view; and it has
changed again, in the light of relativity and
quantum theory. Do such changes in our
concept of time affect what we believe about
God and God's relationship to the universe?
Do they make it easier or more difficult to
appropriate traditional formulations of the
doctrines of God?
The answer most people would give, if
asked about such issues—and they'd be in
good company—would be "'I'm not sure."
They are confused. Well, it is a maxim of
great truth that education is a process in
which one begins by being confused and
winds up by being confused at a higher level.
So it may be tonight!
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St. Augustine famously remarked that
if he wasn't actually asked the question,
"What is time?", he knew well enough what
time was, but that upon being asked that
question, he found that he didn't know.
And Aristotle before him noted uncom-
fortably that
[o]ne part of [time] has been and is not,
while the other is going to be and is not
yet. Yet time—both infinite time and
any time you like to take—is made up of
these. One would naturally suppose that
what is made up of things which do not
exist could have no share of reality. 5
Everything that we value, cherish, or fear
has either vanished forever or not yet arrived.
All we have is the infinitesimal fragment of
the now, and even that vanishes, as soon as
we try to lay hands on it. But I'll have more
to say shortly about the present moment.
Other philosophers have agreed with
Aristotle. For example, the idealist philoso-
pher, J. M. E. McTaggart, argued in a clas-
sic paper that the temporal order is impos-
sible, since every event in it would have to
be simultaneously past, present and future;
and these predicates are directly self-contra-
dictory. That is, time is unintelligible with-
out the concept now, and now is contradic-
tory. A way around this is to say there is no
past nor future, only before and after—rela-
tive in time, relative to one another with no
moment privileged as now. Now would be a
concept like this or /, expressing the point
of view of the speaker, but not features of
the world. Of course, if time itself were cy-
clic, then past and future would have no
meaning, because the remote past would also
be the remote future, and we could affect
the past. And yet, and yet....
No wonder Augustine found his grip on
what he thought he knew slipping. Let me
quote a few words from McTaggart 's famous
chapter on time in his book. The Nature of
Existence:
It seems highly paradoxical to assert that
time is unreal, and that all statements
which involve its reality are erroneous.
Such a statement involves a departure
from the natural position of mankind
which is far greater than that involved in
the assertion of the unreality of space or
the unreality of matter. For in each
man's experience there is a part—his
own states as known to him by intro-
spection—which does not appear to be
spatial or material. But we have no
experience which does not appear to be
temporal. Even our judgements that
time is unreal appear to be themselves in
time.... 6
McTaggart then points out that
in all ages and in all parts of the world
the belief in the unreality of time has
shown itself to be singularly persistent.
In the philosophy and religion of the
West—and still more, I suppose, in the
philosophy and religion of the East—we
find the doctrine of the unreality of time
continually recurring. Neither philoso-
phy nor religion ever hold themselves
apart from mysticism for any long
period and almost all mysticism denies
the reality of time. 7
A few years ago, Kitty Muggeridge
translated de Caussade's spiritual classic
Self-Abandonment to Divine Providence. De
Caussade (d. 1751) was, as you may know,
a Jesuit priest and spiritual director to a con-
vent. As a title for her translation,
Muggeridge chose The Sacrament of the
Present Moment. This idea of being in the
presence ofGod only in the present moment
is central to Benedictine spirituality, too.
And from the Orthodox tradition, it seems
good to remember Lossky's Mystical The-
ology of the Eastern Church and
Schmemann's The World as Sacrament. We
have only the now, however elusive that may
be, in which to meet God. And yet....
Incarnational theology must take time
seriously, just as it takes matter seriously.
The assertion that mysticism denies the re-
ality of time runs counter to incarnational
and sacramental theology. Whatever mys-
tics claim to experience of being outside time
in some mystical union with God (sometimes
described as "self-forgetting"), nevertheless,
we are all, always, human organisms; crea-
tures who must move into God's future at
one second per second.
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We never stand still in time, nor can
we "save" time, nor "spend" time, nor
"kill" time: we must always be pilgrims,
moving on. We are inevitably, inescapably,
directed toward the future. I have often
thought about this aspect of our created
nature and wondered at the Church's ob-
session with the past. If the world of space-
time is sacrament and we are created such
that we are constantly propelled into the
future at one second per second, perhaps
God is expressing something of the divine
loving purpose for us through time. The
breeze blowing in our face carries a fresh-
ness from God's future, but we look back-
wards into dust. What spiritual signifi-
cance has our refusal to face forward, to
acknowledge our orientation in time? Of
course, an important aspect of human and
institutional life is our memory of the past.
(We do not remember the future. ) Memory
may be important, but it is not where hope
Whatever mystics claim to experience of
being outside time in some mystical
union with God (sometimes described as
"self-forgetting"), nevertheless, we are
all, always, human organisms, creatures
who must move into God ys future at one
second per second.
lies. Hope is a forward-directed theologi-
cal virtue.
In all theological speculation about the
way the world is (or appears to be), I find
myself agreeing with my predecessor as
Warden of the Society of Ordained scien-
tists, Arthur Peacocke, when he said,
Or, as the poet Robert Browning put it in his
poem, "Fra Lippo Lippi":
This world's no blot for us, nor blank: It
means intensely and it means good. To
find its meaning is my meat and drink.''
Now
Let me come back, for a moment, to the
phrase, "God is here, Christ is now." Attend-
ing to God now, being centered in awareness
of one's place in the present moment, isn't just
good spiritual advice: it is our only option.
We cannot meet God in the future nor in the
past, nor ought we to console our time-bound
selves by trafficking in spatial imagery.
The commonsensical view of time as-
sumed by the theology of previous centu-
ries seemed to be supported by classical
physics. The present moment exists, the past
has ceased to exist, the future does not yet
exist: the metaphysical basis of the theories
of classical physics appears to eliminate time
altogether as an aspect of
the world. Physical pro-
cesses are independent of
time and hence reversible.
In a memorable phrase.
Ilya Prigogine described
this as "the exorcism of
time." l0 Thus, classical
dynamics observed its
world of quantifiable spa-
tial extension, the res
extensa, from the timeless
perspective of a god, from
eternity. Eternity was ab-
stracted from this worldview: it was either
timelessness or an unchanging present. And
this was the notion of time and eternity one
finds, for example, in the theology of
Boethius:
While we need not expect to read off
directly from nature properties of the
Deity, as it were, nevertheless, it would
seem odd if there were nothing to be
inferred of the Creator from the
properties of the creation. 8
Embracing the infinite lengths of past
and future, it [God's knowledge]
considers everything as if it were going
on now in a simple mode of awareness.
So, if you want to weigh the presentness
with which he discerns everything, you
will more rightly judge it to be not a
foreknowledge as of the future, but the
knowledge of a never failing instant."
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James Clerk Maxwell highlighted the
distinction between the reversible mechani-
cal laws of classical physics and the essen-
tially irreversible natural processes described
by the second law of thermodynamics. In a
letter to Mark Pattison, in April 1868, Max-
well wrote,
if every motion great and small were
accurately reversed, and the world left to
itself again, everything would happen
backwards the fresh water would collect
out of the sea and run up the rivers and
finally fly up into the sky in drops which
would extract heat from the air and
evaporate and afterwards in condensing
would shoot out rays of light to the sun
and so on. Of course all living things
would regrade from the grave to the
cradle and we should have a memory of
the future but not of the past. The reason
why we do not expect anything of this
kind to take place at any time is our
experience of irreversible processes, all
of one kind, and this leads to the doctrine
of a beginning and an end instead of a
cyclical progression for ever. 12
Thermodynamics in the nineteenth cen-
tury and relativity in the twentieth century
reintroduced time into physical theory, but
not necessarily in a way easy to accommo-
date with traditional theological writings. In
Newton's world, any observers could agree
that two events had occurred simultaneously.
Albert Einstein theorized that if one observer
were moving relative to another, they could
not agree that two events were simultaneous:
there could be no universal present moment
in a universe that is a succession of instanta-
neous spaces. Einstein's special and gen-
eral relativity use a single geometry to de-
scribe Minkowskian "space-time." But rela-
tivistic physics only uses concepts such as
before and after, not past, present, future, or
now. The geometry of space-time disturb-
ingly omits our experience of the present
moment. How might the absence of the con-
cept now from the scientific description of
the world in relativistic physics matter for
theological discourse and the religious life
in which it is such an utterly pivotal idea?
A pivotal idea, indeed. But what is now?
A concept much more problematical than
here. Centering oneself in space in prepara-
tion for prayer is relatively straightforward,
compared to understanding oneself now. "I
am in this room, at this desk, preparing to
pray... at this moment, preparing to place
myself consciously before God,
now... now... now."
But even here, modern science under-
mines or supersedes the commonsensical
view of the present moment being, as it were,
an instantaneous cusp, the crest of the stand-
ing wave in the flow of time from the future
into the past.
I have in mind Miroslav Holub's essay
in The Dimension of the Present Moment.
If the present moment is where we must meet
God, then there are some surprises from ex-
perimental psychology:
The fact that I cannot imagine the
present moment has always worried me.
By the present moment I mean a
conscious individual state or process, an
experience: the larger scale moment is
easier to grasp. What is a moment, what
is this moment in which I evidently
exist, unlike nature, which according to
Whitehead's famous quotation does not
exist in a moment? As a matter of fact, I
can imagine eternity much better,
particularly when looking up at the sky
or the ceiling of a waiting room.... For
me, the present moment has always been
a dimension without a dimension.... I
have finally found satisfaction in recent
data of experimental psychology. The
present moment lasts three seconds. In
our consciousness, the present moment
lasts about three seconds, with small
individual differences. 13
Time as space
In thinking about time, it is natural to
picture it in spatial and, therefore, mislead-
ing terms. Time is a river into which one
can never step twice. As in the Isaac Watts
hymn, "Time, like an ever-rolling stream,
bears all its sons away" l4—daughters, too.
Time is an arrow in another metaphor, an
arrow with no target, coming from nowhere.
Now is the cusp of the standing wave in the
stream, with the future sweeping up toward
it and the past sliding away behind. Is that
your picture? Or is now the point of the ar-
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row? Both spatial images. Such spatial
imagery possesses our imaginations; but I
don't know how far we increase our under-
standing of time, if that is possible at all,
when what we are doing is comparing time
to a process occurring in time. There seems
something circular in trying to get a grip on
time in this way. Nevertheless, because we
remember the past but not the future and
seem surrounded by one-way processes,
these spatial images H
seem true to experi-
ence. An approach to
Einstein's relativity
sees time as analogous
to space. The entire en-
semble of events, past,
present, and future, is
equally real, equally ac-
tual in a static, block
universe. Our percep-
tion of time, of happening and change, in
this interpretation, is merely the product of
human psychology, as in the quote from
Weyl earlier: "The objective world simply
is." Or as Paul Davies wrote in God and the
New Physics,
[Relativity] does not regard time as a
sequence of events which happen.
Instead, all of past and future are simply
there, and time extends in either
direction from any given moment in
much the same way as space stretches
away from any particular place. 15
Time, then, does not bear all its sons
and daughters away like a rolling stream:
they are still "there," only in an inaccessible
spatio-temporal location. The future exists:
it's there on the map already. We will en-
counter it, when we reach the right spatio-
temporal coordinates. One would think that
Boethius' God, experiencing all moments
simultaneously, would fit such a view. One
would think also that such a deterministic
interpretation would eliminate human free
will and, therefore, all moral praise and
blame. The past has not caused the present:
what one does now will not change the fu-
ture, because the future exists already. This
is not, as Christians have supposed and have
written into their theology, a universe of be-
ing and becoming. There are non-determin-
istic interpretations that deny the picture I
have described. Professors Chris Isham and
John Polkinghome have written up an ex-
citing, not unduly technically demanding,
unresolved debate on these issues, to which
I draw your attention and to which I am in-
debted. 16
Of course, an important aspect of hu-
man and institutional life is our memory
of the past. (We do not remember the
future.) Memory may be important, but
it is not where hope lies. Hope is a
forward-directed theological virtue.
In modern physics, the time dimension
of space-time has different properties from
the space dimensions. These properties are
worth noticing, because they throw some
light on what's wrong with spatial images.
For one thing, time has direction: that
is, it always moves from future to past—or
rather, it's not so much that time has a direc-
tion, but that things move in time. Nothing
moves backwards in time. The possibility
of moral action depends on this truth. Even
though some physical processes or the math-
ematical descriptions of them are not direc-
tional, time itself is. Modern physics also
states that, if a process is physically possible,
so is the same process run backwards. Physi-
cal processes are "symmetrical" in this way.
So why is it that, at the level of causal ob-
servation, the world is temporally asym-
metrical?
Secondly, we can move at varying
speeds through space, but not through time.
As a hot-rod kid, I once drove my Dad's
Buick Riviera at 120 mph in a 30 mph zone.
Big mistake legally, though very gratifying
emotionally, at that moment. But one can-
not accelerate through time: one is swept
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into the future at a constant 1 second per sec-
ond. Acceleration up to 2 seconds per sec-
ond, so as to overtake your business rivals, is
impossible, as is the desire to slow down to
half-speed. As Faustus pleaded, quoting Ovid:
O Icnte, lente currite noctis equi: the
stars move still, time runs, the clock will
strike, the devil will come and Faustus
must be damn'd. 17
Recall that Ovid wanted more time in the
arms of his mistress, while Faustus was be-
ing swept inexorably to his doom
The uncommonsensical description
of time in relativity carries with it
theological implications, if theology
assumes a universal invariant time
unaffected by gravity or velocity.
Thirdly, everything in time occupies all
the time during which it exists. Nothing in
time excludes anything else. With space, it
is different. If I, a solid object, am in this
space, you are not—unless you push me out
of your way. But time isn't like that: we
cannot speak of a position in time in the same
way as a position in space, which we can
change.
The second law ofthermodynamics and
the human tragedy
The mystery of meeting the love of
God in prayer is bound up in the mystery
of who we are, and who we are is bound
up in our experience and understanding of
time. But our understanding of time is
emotionally loaded by entropy: this is
kairos time. The Oxford physical chemist
and evangelist for atheism, Peter Atkins,
makes great play of the view that the irre-
versible, purposeless exploration of the
geometry of time is what the second law of
thermodynamics is all about. Atkins has
no doubt that time is theologically signifi-
cant, because, as he pointed out on the BBC
just this week, the processes increasing the
entropy of the universe reveal futility in
believing in a good God with purposes for
the creation. Entropy, an utterly temporal
phenomenon, is a temporal argument for
asserting that there is no God. I think
Atkins is wrong. Long before Clausius or
Lord Kelvin described entropy in terms of
heat transfer down a thermal gradient or
the inefficiency of the conversion of heat
energy to work, everyone
knew what the kairos of en-
tropy change was about.
All human beings,
even Peter Atkins, live in
the present, sometimes
dominated by real or imagi-
nary memories of the past,
sometimes hopeful, some-
times terrified by the fu-
ture. Poets were there be-
fore the thermodynamicists and wrote of
the universal human experience:
Had we but world enough and time,
This coyness, Lady, were no crime.
We would sit down and think which way
To walk and pass our love's long day.
Thou by the Indian Ganges' side
Shouldst rubies find: I by the tide
Of Humber would complain. I would
Love you ten years before the Flood
And you should, if you please, refuse
Till the conversion of the Jews.
My vegetable love should grow
Vaster than empires and more slow;
A hundred years should go to praise
Thine eyes and on thy forehead gaze;
Two hundred to adore each breast;
But thirty thousand to the rest;
An age at least to every part,
And the last age should show your heart;
For, Lady, you deserve this state,
Nor would I love at lower rate.
But at my back I always hear
Time's winged chariot hurrying near;
And yonder all before us lie
Deserts of vast eternity. 18
This is the human condition and the constant
refrain of poets:
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Gather ye rosebuds while ye may,
Old Time is still a-flying:
And this same flower that smiles today
Tomorrow will be dying. 19
This is the poetry of the second law of ther-
modynamics, of entropy, of the inevitable
change and decay I see in all around.
Go not gentle into that good night.
Rage, rage against the dying of the
light. 20
This is part of the fallenness experienced by
humanity? Is this what processes in time
convey? Is this the necessary corollary to
hope being a future-directed phenomenon?
One of the sharpest insights into how hu-
mans experience kairos time came to me from
my pastoral care ministry, and it added a se-
riousness to my reflections. A severely de-
pressed parishioner of mine, looking back on
the depths of her despair, said that the worst
bit about being in that dark state was her con-
stant terror that the next second hadn't hap-
pened yet. Think about that. That human
condition of being embedded in time felt for
my parishioner like an eternity. And her ex-
perience, far from rare among us, makes the
mystics' denial of the reality of time and
block-universe speculation of atemporality
seem cheap. It marks the locus of the seri-
ousness with which Christianity treats time.
You will appreciate that this time-bound
human condition gives some of the emotional
power to one of the doctrines of Christian
faith: the hope of salvation from the iron gates
of time that open into the grave.
Infinity and the Unconscious Mind
Experiences of transcendence very of-
ten have a timeless quality: indeed, the sen-
sation of time having stopped, of being some-
how "outside time" is almost a defining qual-
ity of such experience. The "still point of the
turning world" is T. S. Eliot's point of meet-
ing with the eternal God. :i If Christianity has
been attracted to the physical sciences in its
quest to articulate its attempts to understand
the relationship between the divine and the
temporal, there are insights in the recent work
of depth psychologists to which attention
might also usefully be directed. I allude only
fleetingly to the work of the Chilean psycho-
analyst Ignacio Matte Blanco, a devout Ro-
man Catholic. His The Unconscious as Infi-
nite Sets, published in 1975, was followed
in 1988 by Thinking, Feeling and Being. 22
In these books he explored the logic of the
Unconscious, in which the converse of any
relation is treated as identical with the rela-
tion: that is, temporally asymmetric relations
are treated as if they are symmetrical. The
effect on our experience of time is clear: he
suggests that the extent to which symmetric
logic is present is symmetric logic is present
is a measure of the influence of the Uncon-
scious mind. If one event is before another
in time, to the Unconscious the first is also
after the second. In symmetric logic, "A is
before B" implies that "B is before A," and
from this it follows that all time is simulta-
neously present to the Unconscious mind.
Clinical experience of the Unconscious dem-
onstrates that it possesses the properties of
the eternal as Boethius understood it. To
what extent, if any, is the Unconscious the
root of the mystics' experience of the time-
less aspect of God? As Eliot says in "The
Four Quartets,"
Words, after speech, reach
Into the silence. Only by the form, the
pattern,
Can words or music reach
The stillness, as a Chinese jar still
Moves perpetually in its stillness,
Not the stillness of the violin, while the
note lasts.
Not that only, but the co-existence,
Or say that the end precedes the
beginning.
And the end and the beginning were
always there
Before the beginning and after the end.
And all is always now.23
This internal psychological aspect of the
experience of the eternal Holy merits much
more attention than can be devoted to it now,
but it is worth asking what the relationship
of the laws of physics we construct or con-
strue to the Unconscious might be.
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The nature of space-time
We no longer think in terms of absolute
time: we know that time is intimately bound
up in the nature of the universe in a sort of
"trinitarian structure" of space, time, and
matter, and that these interact.
The debate in which Caroline, Princess
of Wales, interested herself was between
Leibniz's view that time is nothing over and
above an observable ordered system of
events and that space is nothing over and
above an observable system of bodies, and
Newton's view in which space and time have
an existence independent of events and bod-
ies, and are God's sensor iurn—aspects of
God. That's the "container theory," and it
has occupied a strong place in theology since
Newton. In Leibniz, space and time are not
"things" in their own right: they are merely
a way of describing the relationships be-
tween events.
The other view that Newton held was
that, in order to deal with our experience
of events and objects—our experience
[nota bene)—we posit the existence of
space and time, each with a certain struc-
ture. We can't directly observe the proper-
ties of space and time; the structures emerge
in the process of inference to the best ex-
planation, as we construct physical theo-
ries. So, we could have time according to
either of Newton's theories—that is, even
if there were no events, we could still speak
intelligibly about time in any way consis-
tent with our experience of events, either
kairos or chronos.
The Oxford philosopher of science, Bill
Newton-Smith, proposes that one could re-
place space and time with space-time, and it
wouldn't affect this debate. 24 General rela-
tivity is neutral about the outcome of the de-
bate. This, then, remains an open question,
with theological implications still to be
drawn out.
Relativity, quantum theory, cosmology, and
eschatology
The uncommonsensical description of
time in relativity carries with it theological
implications, if theology assumes a univer-
sal invariant time unaffected by gravity or
velocity. Massive objects—objects that
have great mass—such as the earth or the
sun or Black Holes, curve space-time to an
observable degree. Gravity is thought of a
geometrical property of space-time. It af-
fects space and it affects time. Newton'
Law of Universal Gravitation predicts that
the gravitational attraction on an object be-
comes less at higher altitudes from the
earth. The further out from the surface of
the earth a spacecraft goes, the weaker the
gravitational field. The closer to the earth's
surface we go, the stronger gravity is, the
more sharply space-time is curved or
waiped: the stronger the gravitational field,
the greater the time-warp. According to the
Theory of Relativity, gravity affects time.
The weaker the gravitational field, the
faster time flies: the lives of airline pilots
—
or even the men and women in the philoso-
phy department up on the third floor here
are shortened relative to those who live on
the ground. In fact, I have calculated that
time moves more slowly at my feet than at
my head by about 1 x 10 15 seconds per sec-
ond. This effect has been noticed by my
Oxford students, who agree that time does
seem to move slowly at the feet of lectur-
ers. And at the Schwartzschild radius of
Black Holes, the curvature of space-time
is so extreme that time stands still. It would
seem, then, that the time we experience, and
the time in which we construct theology, is
not the constant, steady-stream, common-
sensical picture.
And it turns out that time is also affected
by how quickly a body is moving, as in the
deathless limerick:
There was a young lady named Bright
Who travelled much faster than light.
She set off one day
In a relative way
And returned the previous night. 25
Experiments have been carried out with
pairs of very accurate and robust clocks.
They were started simultaneously, and one
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was loaded onto a commercial airliner that
set off to wherever it was going, and the
other was left sitting in the laboratory. Af-
ter some hours of flying, the clocks were
compared. They gave different readings,
the clock in the aircraft displaying an ear-
lier time than the laboratory clock. This
effect is called time dilation. At the sort of
speeds we ordinarily attain, the effect isn't
great; but the closer to the speed of light
one travels, the greater the effect. At 10%
of the speed of light, time is slowed by
0.5%. At 50% the speed of light, time is
slowed by 15%; and at 90%, it is slowed by
30%. Scientists make use of this effect in
particle research, by pushing particles along
to only 1 kilometer per second less than the
speed of light. Events happening so quickly
that they could not ordi-





in the measurement of
time itself, when one
gets down to very small
intervals, to quantum di-
mensions. Perhaps
time, too, is discontinu-
ous, quantized, and not
a continuum, not a
stream that bears all its sons and daughters
away, but a burst of packets of "chronons."
What about the universe?
On the very largest scale, that of the uni-
verse, questions about time raise theologi-
cal issues. In the 1920s, the American as-
tronomer Edwin Hubble, after whom the
Hubble Space Telescope is named, noticed
that the light from distant galaxies is more
red than expected. Inference to the best ex-
planation led to an understanding of why the
light from these faraway objects is shifted
toward the red end of the spectrum: the gal-
axies, sources of light energy, are moving
away from us (and from each other), and that
the farther away they are, the faster away
they are moving.
Because light moves at a fixed speed
through empty space, it takes time for light
to reach us from faraway objects. Light
from the sun originated at the sun eight min-
utes before we see it. That is, as we look at
the sun, we observe it as it was eight min-
utes in the past. As we observe the star next-
nearest to the earth, Proxima Centauri, we
see light that left that star four years ago.
What we see when we look into a starlit sky
is a chronicle of ancient starlight. We can
never see the present, for that present mo-
ment for us is an artifact, utterly related to
the unprivileged cosmological perspective
from which we view the universe. Stars that
we see twinkling in the night may have
While in prison and waiting to be taken
out and bludgeoned to death, Boethius
meditated on time and eternity in his
Consolation of Philosophy. There he
wrote hisfamous definition of eternity:
"Eternity is the total and complete pos-
session of unending life all at once."
burned out or blown up in a supernova ex-
plosion before there was life on Earth, or
before there was a planet Earth. There is a
sense, then, in which we live in the past,
and there is a sense in which all time is
present at any moment.
The shape of things to come
And what of the future? Here is an as-
pect of space-time that has profound impli-
cations for eschatology, that branch of the-
ology which deals with the end of all things,
including time and space.
The universe in the current "standard
model," Big Bang Theory, has a geometry:
it is curved by gravity exerted by objects with
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mass. If there is very little mass (on average
just the equivalent of three hydrogen atoms
per cubic meter) the curvature is described
as "open" or "flat." In this case, the expand-
ing universe Hubble described will go on ex-
panding for ever, becoming colder and "thin-
ner" in what is called the "Heat Death" of
the universe.
If the average density is greater than
three hydrogen atoms per cubic meter, then
gravity wins, the expansion we now observe
will slow to a stop and then the universe will
collapse back in on itself, in a reverse of the
Big Bang—a process poetically called the
"Big Crunch." The result will be a state of
enormous density at tremendous tempera-
tures. Some speculate that the universe may
be cyclic, going through an endless repeti-
tion of Bangs and Crunches; but as there
could be no observational consequences of
this for us, speculation it remains. The pic-
ture is something like an expanding and con-
tracting heart, with the spores of life grow-
ing in the cool spaces between the stars dur-
ing the expansion phase, then withering in
the "autumnal collapse."
The theological implications of the end
of the universe are bleak: in either geom-
etry the universe in created to end in futility.
It forces Christians to have faith in God
alone, as the universe is not here to stay, not
everlasting in any sense hospitable to life.
These aspects of the fate of the universe
have been woven into a contemporary creation
myth of great power and beauty, a myth which
has inspired poets. John Fowles writes of,
A phoenix infinity; or an infinite
expansion. Whichever it is, the astro-
physicists now know what Heraclitus
guessed: that suns must grow in heat
and finally consume their planetary
systems. Look out of the window:
everything you see is frozen fire in
transit between tire and fire. Cities,
equations, lovers, landscapes: all are
hurtling towards the hydrogen crucible. :h
Or, as the Christian poet Norman
Nicholson expressed it in his poem, "The Ex-
panding Universe,"
The furthest stars recede
Faster than the earth moves,
Almost as fast as light;
The infinite
Adjusts itself to our need.
For, far beyond the furthest, where
Light is snatched backward, no
Star leaves echo or shadow
To prove it had ever been there.
And if the universe
Reversed and showed
The colour of its money;
If now unobservable light
Flowed inward, and the skies snowed
A blizzard of galaxies,
The lens of night would burn
Brighter than the focussed sun,
And man turn blinded
With white-hot darkness in his eyes. 27
Here pressing in on us, fully engaging
the imagination, is a myth of great power.
Big Bang theory, the coming into being of
space-time, the expansion of a universe, the
explosion of supemovae and the scattering
of the heavy atoms so that we might be, is
more than a lifeless description from phys-
ics: it has about it the logic of human self-
involvement. It becomes a myth about the
meaning of our place in created time. But so
too, does the end of all things. Can we the-
ologize about this? Lutheran theologian Ted
Peters plunges in:
The end of the cosmos will be something
new too. The question that remains is
whether the anticipated heat death
constitutes a sort of cosmic Good Friday,
and whether it makes sense to hope that
beyond it lies an Easter for the universe. 28
The mystery of eternity
If science has made our understand-
ing of time, already a difficult concept, even
less intuitively obvious, what of eternity?
However we understand it, eternity is not
something like temporal everlastingness.
Time, like space, is contingent—or as
Christians want to say, time and space are
"created" and held in being by God, for the
divine putposes.
And what does Christianity teach? On
which ideas about time, its reality and its
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nature, are our doctrines based? On a time
that has a reality apart from God? Or,
rather, one that is utterly bound up in the
created order? Time is not less a mystery
now, but is time in modern physics con-
gruent with our beliefs about God in a way
that perhaps Newtonian absolute time was
not?
I have referred often to Boethius (480-
524 c.E.). While in prison and waiting to
be taken out and bludgeoned to death, he
meditated on time and eternity in his Con-
solation ofPhilosophy. There he wrote his
famous definition of eternity: "Eternity is
the total and complete possession of un-
ending life all at once." :9 Boethius stood
as a Christian in the Neoplatonist tradition.
His was Plato's understanding of eternity,
which remains attractive to many today:
"time is the moving image of eternity," that
is, time is real, but there is an unchanging,
immutable, timeless realm that casts its
shadow on the turning spheres below.
Roger Scruton traces the power of its ap-
peal:
This vision was adapted to Roman
stoicism by Cicero, to Christian
devotion by St Augustine and to the
pagan world of late antiquity by
Plotinus.-"
Aquinas and his successors approached the
idea of eternity from mathematics, from the
properties of number. 31 John Lucas, phi-
losophy tutor at Merton College, Oxford,
argues that we had better be careful of
speaking about eternal God in this way,
because it reduces God's personhood. And
a God "standing outside time," as it were,
seeing every moment at once, denies hu-
man freewill. Some models of eternity,
constructed to accommodate ideas of God's
foreknowledge, are like the concept of the
block universe, in that what they seek to
affirm about an eternal God's omniscience
with respect to time entails denying the
freedom we believe we experience as crea-
tures in time, with an undetermined—or not
entirely determined—future.
Anselm wrote in his Proslogion:
You were not, therefore, yesterday, nor
will you be tomorrow, but yesterday and
today and tomorrow, you are. Indeed,
you exist neither yesterday nor today nor
tomorrow but are absolutely outside all
time [es extra omne tempus ] For
yesterday and today and tomorrow are
completely in time; however, you,
though nothing can be without you, are
nevertheless not in place or time but all
things are in you, for nothing can
contain you, but you contain all things. 32
Can we never escape from spatial im-
agery for time, except by looking not out-
wards into the universe, but inwardly into
the Unconscious mind? Is to do so to re-
treat into irrationality and give up on the cen-
turies-long attempt to reconcile our theologi-
cal models of God with our scientific mod-
els of the universe and their metaphysical
bases? What is our relation with eternity as
we stand precariously in the present moment
and in a relationship with God? Where and
what is that "point of intersection of the time-
less with time" that T. S. Eliot described as
the "occupation of the saint"?
Conclusion
Objective time is gone. It is gone in rela-
tivity, gone from the quantum world, gone
in cosmology, where scales and redefinitions
of time, real and imaginary, feel almost ar-
bitrary. Only in a very reduced frame of ref-
erence do we still meet the idea of simple,
linear, objective, absolute time. What we
now see in physics is congruent with spiri-
tuality: we are immersed in time and time-
lessness, and we are in touch with eternity,
as Boethius saw it.
Time performs the function of showing
the limitations of description, of science, of
language, and the limits of the universe. Like
the rest of creation, time is sacramental—it
points beyond the limits of the reality we
have constructed around ourselves. Time
does not stand still—at least, not for long
—
and as with so much else, the experience of
time is more real than its explanation: this
seems to me to be the character of sacramen-
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tal reality: like all sacraments, time points
beyond itself to God.
I close with a thought-provoking pas-
sage from the Gospel of Thomas. If the
Canon does not allow us to claim this
pericope as originating with Jesus, we might
still find ourselves richer spiritually by re-
flecting upon it:
The disciples said to Jesus, "Tell us, how
will our end come?" Jesus said, "Have
you found the beginning, then, that you
are looking for the end? You see, the
end will be where the beginning is.
Congratulations to the one who stands at
the beginning: that one will know the
end and will not taste death." 3
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